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I. INTRODUCTION
Within the last twenty years many large corporations and mid-size
employers have begun implementing a change in their workforce: shifting
large portions of their workforce into independent contractor positions.1
Adopting this change in the classification of their workforce has enabled
both corporate and private employers to avoid paying required benefits, and
to shield themselves from the liability that accompanies the employer-
employee relationship.
Section II of this comment will explore Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.,2 a
Ninth Circuit case involving Microsoft's denial of benefits to certain
workers based upon their employment classification. Although the Ninth
t J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 2002; B.A., University of California,
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for publication. I dedicate this Comment to all of the farmworkers who
face these issues as a reality of life and to organizations like MALDEF and CRLA that
work to make a difference.
1. See RICHARD S. BELous, THE CONTINGENT ECONOMY: THE GROWTH OF THE
TEMPORARY, PART-TMIE AND SUBCONTRACTED WORKFORCE 16 (1989) (citing a 175 percent
increase in the number of temporary workers from 1980 to 1988, compared to a 14 percent
increase in the total civilian workforce). Another estimate of those working for temporary
employment agencies puts the increase at 240 percent between 1984 and 1994. See Jaclyn
Fierman, The Contingency Work Force, FORTUNE, Jan. 10, 1994, at 30-3 1; Developments in
the Law - Employment Discrimination, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1568, 1651 n.28 (1996) (noting
two studies, which indicated that the number of temporary agencies increased from 820 in
1963 to 16,000 in 1993 and had grown by 239 percent between 1975 and 1987).
2. 97 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1105 (2000).
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Circuit in Vizcaino decided in favor of the class of plaintiffs, its reasoning
and the relief it provided were unduly limited to this select group of
Microsoft workers. As such, the holding's limitation adversely affects
another large group of workers: the farmworkers of California.
Section III will explain the origins of an employer's ability to deny
benefits to certain workers based upon their employment classification.
This explanation will link the development of this ability to the long history
of discriminatory treatment of farmworkers, which can be defined in four
evolutionary stages.
Section IV will conclude this comment by showing that, because the
final stage of this evolution is not limited to farmworkers, it has led to a
broad degeneration of labor protections, which has begun to affect workers
in other industries. The conclusion will also illustrate the similarities and
differences between the Microsoft workers in Vizcaino and farmworkers in
order to suggest future actions to redirect the evolution of the law to help
both groups.
II. A SWIFT REMEDY FOR SOME INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS IN THE
HIGH TECH INDUSTRY
A. Vizcaino v. Microsoft
In the late 1980s, Microsoft, "one of the country's fastest growing and
most successful corporations and the world's largest software company,"3
implemented a change in its workforce. Under this system, Microsoft
employed a "core staff of permanent employees. ' 4 It characterized those
core employees as "'regular employees' and offer[ed] them a wide variety
of benefits, including paid vacations, sick leave, holidays, short-term
disability, group health and life insurance,"5 the Microsoft Savings Plus
Plan ("SPP"), and the Microsoft Employee Stock Purchase Plan ("ESPP").6
Microsoft supplemented its core staff of employees with other
individuals whom it employed for various lengths of time and whom it
classified as either "independent contractors" or "freelancers." 7 Microsoft
required that these "temporary" employees sign the "Microsoft Corporation
Independent Contractor Copyright Assignment and Non-Disclosure
Agreement," and refused to pay them any benefits.8
3. Id. at 1189.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1189-90.
8. Id. at 1190.
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Despite the independent contractors' classification as temporary
employees, "Microsoft fully integrated [them] into its workforce."9 The
temporary employees "often worked on teams along with regular
employees, sharing the same supervisors, performing identical Uob]
functions, and working the same core hours."10  The major differences
between the two employee classifications were that Microsoft gave the
temporary employees badges of a different color, email addresses with
different server names, paid them through its accounts receivable
department instead of its payroll department, required that they attend a
"less formal" orientation, and excluded them from company functions.
11
Upon examination of Microsoft's employment records in 1989 and
1990, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determined that "Microsoft's
freelancers were not independent contractors but [regular] employees for
withholding and employment tax purposes. 12  Microsoft agreed to
contribute past and future withholding taxes and "to pay [the] freelancers
retroactively for any overtime.., worked."
13
As a result of the IRS rulings, Microsoft changed its employee
structure once again. Microsoft offered some freelancers positions as
permanent employees and gave the rest two options: (1) terminate their
employment relationship with Microsoft; or (2) continue to work at the
company as employees of a new temporary employment agency. 14 The
new temporary employment agency, which Microsoft created, "would
provide payroll services, withhold federal taxes, and pay the employer's
portion of FICA taxes" for the workers. 5
In light of the IRS rulings, the plaintiffs, former freelancers, filed
internal claims for the various benefits that regular employees received,
including the SPP and the ESPP.16 Microsoft concluded that the claimants
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The IRS based its decision "on information received from Microsoft and on
information received from a representative sampling of the workers in that job position." Id.
at 1190-91 n.2 (noting that the IRS, in its letter rulings, held these individuals to be
employees "for purposes of the Federal Insurance Contribution Act, the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act, and for Collection of Income Tax at the Source on Wages").
13. Id. at 1191.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. The SPP "is a cash or deferred salary arrangement under § 401(k) of the
Internal Revenue Code, which permits Microsoft's employees to save and invest up to
fifteen percent of their income through tax-deferred payroll deductions" with fifty percent
employer matching. Id. The ESPP enabled Microsoft employees "to purchase company
stock at eighty-five percent of the lower of the fair market value on the first or on the last
day of each six-month offering period through payroll deductions of from two to ten
percent." Id.
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were not eligible because, as independent contractors, they were
"personally responsible for providing all of their own benefits."' 7
Immediately following Microsoft's denial of their claims, the
employees filed suit challenging its decision to deny them benefits. I8 After
certifying the eight plaintiffs as representatives of a class of "common-law
employees," the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Microsoft on all counts. 19
The plaintiffs appealed on their SPP and ESPP claims. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, in a sharply worded decision, reversed the lower
court's decision, holding that because: (1) the SPP was ambiguous, the
doctrine of contra proferentem2 ° requires the court to construe it in favor of
the plaintiffs21 ; and (2) the ESPP itself stated that it applied to all
employees as defined by Internal Revenue Service Code Section 423-
which refers to common law employees and makes no distinction between
regular and temporary employees-the plaintiffs were covered in the ESPP
agreement.22
B. The Court's Poor Reasoning in the Vizcaino Decision
Even though the court arrived at the just and proper result in Vizcaino,
it used poor reasoning. Instead of holding as a matter of law that the
freelancers were "regular employees," the court decided the case based on
Microsoft's sloppy or careless drafting. In doing this, the court failed to
attack the system (the independent contractor relationship) that Microsoft
and other employers use to contract around the employment relationship.
In fact, the Vizcaino court even agreed that Microsoft could have avoided
the problem entirely through a more careful drafting of the benefits
contracts to exclude the class of plaintiffs.23
Many commentators agree that the court's reasoning in holding
Microsoft liable was weak.24 The court's failure to address the issue
17. Id.
18. See generally Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., No. C93-178D, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21068, at *1 (W.D. Wash. July 21, 1993).
19. Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21036 (W.D. Wash. July 6,
1994).
20. Under the contra proferentem doctrine, courts generally interpret ambiguous
documents unfavorably to the drafter of the document. See BRYAN A. GARNER, A
DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 218 (2d ed. 1995).
21. Vizcaino, 97 F.3d at 1196.
22. Id. at 1197.
23. According to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, "Microsoft, 'as the drafter of the
plan .... could easily have accomplished the limitation it now urges through the use of more
explicit language."' Id.
24. See Recent Case, 111 HARV. L. REv. 609, 609 (noting that in Vizcaino, "[a]lthough
the Ninth Circuit reached the correct result, its analysis of the employer's 'mistake' in
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squarely reflects the state of the law and exemplifies the court's inability,
or at least unwillingness, to deal with the broader issue. By fashioning a
remedy for Microsoft employees without upsetting or questioning the state
of the law, and by leaving intact the employer's ability to contract around
the employment relationship, the court left many similarly situated
employees without legal recourse. The largest such group is farmworkers.
In Vizcaino, the court had an opportunity to send a message to
employers that they may not creatively devise artificial relationships simply
to avoid paying benefits and to dodge liability. Ironically, in failing to do
so, the Vizcaino decision could, and most likely will, have broader,
perverse, and unintended implications as employers in other industries
learn the benefits of creating independent contractor relationships with their
employees. Thus, the only broad benefit of Vizcaino is that future
employers will certainly double-check the drafting of their benefits
contracts.
C. Understanding the Vizcaino Decision as an Evolution of the Law
In order to understand the significance of the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Vizcaino v. Microsoft, it is important to look at the broader context,
which involves a discussion of farmworkers and the long-standing battle
between the unfettered right to contract and the public policy of employee
protection.Y This comment will argue that Vizcaino is simply a result of
the evolution of the law with regard to farmworkers, which has preserved
growers' ability to exploit farmworkers. This evolution has been guided by
labeling the workers as independent contractors ignores the actual problem faced by courts:
waivers of federal benefits").
25. This battle stems from the search for a pareto optimal employment contract, in
which both the worker offering labor and the employer offering wages will compromise and
agree to make equal sacrifices in order to receive equally valuable benefits. Unfortunately,
however, pareto optimality is a stranger to the employment relationship. This is because
generally one side - the employer - will have much greater bargaining power. Thus, the
only way to get closer to pareto optimality is to counterbalance the employer's ability to
wield unbridled bargaining power, which can be used to force workers to accept unfair
contracts. The numerous statutes that now protect workers show that the United States as a
society has recognized this dilemma and has made it clear that some regulation of the
bargaining process is not only important but also essential.
In the words of Cesar Chavez, Founder of the United Farmworkers Union (UFW) and
Director of the United Farmworkers Organizing Committee for the AFL-CIO:
To try to change conditions without power is like trying to move a car without
gasoline. If the workers are going to do anything, they need their own power.
They need to involve themselves in meaningful ways. Once they achieve a
victory, they can make use of their power to negotiate and change things for the
better.
Cesar Chavez, Introduction to MARK DAY, FoRTY AcREs: CEsAR CHAVEz AND THE FARM
WoRKERS 9, 10 (1971).
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the repeated failure of Congress to protect farmworkers, the
unresponsiveness of the courts to control abuses of the right to contract in
the agricultural industry, and the power and the greed of growers. Thus,
Microsoft's attempt to define a portion of its workforce as independent
contractors is simply a collateral effect of the latest development in the
continued exploitation of farmworkers.
III. THE FOUR STAGES OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP FOR
FARMWORKERS
The development of farmworker exploitation can be seen as a four-
stage evolution: the era of excluding farmworkers from labor protections;
the era of the Bracero Program; the era of sharecropping; and, finally, the
era of the proliferation of independent contractors. In examining the
evolution of the law in these four stages, it is clear that unresponsive courts
and Congress have enabled powerful growers to develop evolving tools,
which employers like Microsoft can now use, to reduce labor costs by
avoiding payment of employee benefits and by shielding themselves from
liability. In this way, the evolution of the law with regard to farmworkers
in the last hundred years has had much broader implications.
A. The First Stage: Agricultural Exceptionism and the Early Treatment
of Farmworkers
Since Congress first began adopting labor protections early last
century, it has repeatedly failed to include any protections for farmworkers.
This historic exclusion is commonly referred to as "agricultural
exceptionism. ' '26 The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), the federal
statute often praised as the single most important legislative protection for
laborers, is a prime example of agricultural exceptionism because it
expressly excludes farmworkers. 27
Agricultural exceptionism has made it extremely difficult for
farmworkers to secure many of their most basic rights. The federal
government and numerous state legislatures have for many reasons chosen
26. See MARC LINDER, MIGRANT WORKERS & MINIMUM WAGES: REGULATING THE
EXPLOITATION OF AGRICULTURAL LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES xvi (1992) (introducing and
explaining the term agricultural exceptionism); PHILIP L. MARTIN, PROMISES TO KEEP:
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE xviii (1996) (describing agricultural
exceptionism as a "farm-labor theme" in the United States); see also SIDNEY FINE,
EXPANDING THE FRONTIERS OF CIVIL RIGHTS: MICHIGAN, 1948-1968 163 (2000) (citing a
1954 Detroit Free Press article, which asserted that farmworkers "had 'less legal, sanitary
and economic protection than medieval serfs"').
27. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2001) (stating that the NLRA's definition of employee "shall
not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer").
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to keep farmworkers in a vulnerable position. "The policy of excluding
farm labor from social and labor legislation... involved unstated
legislative decisions to perpetuate a low-income, disadvantaged farm labor
force."
25
Because Congress excluded them from enjoying the federal
protections of the NLRA, farmworkers were severely disadvantaged
compared to other workers. For instance, farmworkers were unable to use
the strike or work stoppage methods effectively to demand wages, benefits,
or better working conditions. In contrast, wages, benefits, and safe
working conditions were never as much at issue for workers in other
industries to whom Congress afforded protections of the NLRA. Those
workers generally went on strike to increase their salaries and benefits,
while farmworkers many times had to fight just to be paid their existing
wages.
Exclusion from the NLRA also meant very little bargaining power for
farmworkers when dealing with growers and severe limitations on the
ability to unionize. Without the right to unionize and other protections that
the NLRA provided other workers, collective action has been a constant
struggle for farmworkers. 29 With the guidance of Cesar Chavez and groups
like the United Farm Workers (UFW), farmworkers have made some gains,
but the road has been difficult.30 Wealthy growers have strenuously
opposed any efforts to unionize, and many strikes, as well as strike
attempts, have been met with brutality and violence.31 It was also not
uncommon for powerful growers to secure the support of local and state
authorities and the courts.32
28. DONALD PEDERSEN & DALE DAHL, AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT LAW AND POLICY:
A STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF MODERN SOCIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS LEGISLATION ON
AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT I (Minn. Agric. Experiment Station Bulletin 526, 1981).
29. See MARTIN, supra note 26, at 243 (noting that especially because labor is seasonal
in the agricultural industry, "strikes are high-risk undertakings").
30. See id. at 244 (citing the UFW's work during the 1960's and the early 1970's to
organize farmworkers despite growers' violent responses); H. EDWARD RANSFORD, RACE
AND CLASS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY, BLACK, LATINO, ANGLO 124-25 (2d ed. 1994)
(recounting the astounding success of Cesar Chavez's Boycott Grapes! consumer boycott
campaign).
31. See DAY, supra note 25, at 35-36:
Two strikers were killed by grower-vigilantes in the 1933 cotton strike in Pixely
[California] ....
[In the 1934 Imperial Valley Strike] a young girl was suffocated to death by tear
gas thrown [by sheriffs] into a farm workers' meeting hall. Strike leaders were
gathered and put into a prison compound in the desert. The growers' official
vigilante organization, the Associated Farmers, was subsequently founded, and
it organized a citizens' army to attack lettuce strikers in Salinas, California, in
1936.
32. See CAREY McWILIAMS, FACTORIES IN THE FIELD: THE STORY OF MIGRATORY
2002]
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The inability to unionize has only fostered more problems for
farmworkers because they were unable to strike effectively, or stand
together "in concerted action," until the growers made certain concessions.
Instead, many farmworkers endured long hours of backbreaking labor and
were lucky if they were even paid at the end of the day.33
In addition to excluding them from the bargaining process, Congress
again denied farmworkers protection in 1938 when it passed the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA),34 which was Congress' attempt to correct, or
FARM LABOR IN CALIFORNIA 244-45 (1971):
To suppress the strike, the authorities marshaled a force of approximately 1500
armed men - policemen, deputy sheriffs and guards.... As workers attempted
to flee ... they were seized and beaten. [In another strike,] police fired on a
group of strikers as they were leaving for the fields. One worker was shot and
another was badly burned when an officer fired a tear-gas gun at his chest from
a distance of five or six feet. Throughout the following week, squads of police
cars toured the fields, firing volleys of shot over the heads of any strikers they
could locate .... So many arrests were made of strikers that the newspapers
could not keep track of them.
See also LINDA C. MAJKA & THEO J. MAiKA, FARM WORKERS, AGRIBUSINESS, AND THE
STATE 173 (1982):
[G]rowers responded as they had in the past. Strikers were evicted from labor
camps. If they remained, their electricity was shut off and their belongings
piled onto roadways....
[They also] did what they could to intimidate union pickets: they drove their
pickup trucks at excessive speeds alongside picket lines, hired armed guards,
sprayed pickets with sulphur meant to be applied to roadside vines, displayed
shotguns and taunted pickets to come onto their property, and beat individual
pickets who came too close to their property line. As in the past, local law
enforcement agencies attempted to limit the strike's effectiveness. Local courts
issued injunctions limiting the number of pickets, and police and deputies
detained pickets, staged mass arrests, and ignored grower harassment of those
on the picket lines.
33. It is interesting to note that Karl Marx was even shocked by the "labor
phenomenon" in rural California. In 1880, he wrote the following in a letter to Friedrich
Sorge, a journalist friend in the United States: "I should very much be pleased if you would
find me something good on economic conditions in California. California is very important
for me because nowhere else has the upheaval most shamelessly caused by capitalist
centralization taken place with such speed." SAM KUSHNER, LONG ROAD TO DELANO 5
(1975) (citing K. MARX AND F. ENGELS, LETTERS TO AMERICANS, 1848-1895 (NY Int'l
Publishers 1953)). These historic problems in the field continue to the present day. See
Julio Laboy, Jury: Farm Worker Was Harassed, WALL ST. J., July 30, 1997 at CA2, CA6
(describing the first ever sexual harassment case favoring a farmworker victim - she was
fired after complaining about the harassment).
34. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994). The Wall Street Journal considered this Act to be
"'one of the most destructive pieces of economic legislation ever devised,"' and "'[flew
statutes have been so widely denounced by any group as minimum wage laws have been by
economists,' who contend that they perversely 'intensify poverty and diminish the living
standards of the poor."' LINDER, supra note 26, at xviii (citing The Inhuman Minimum,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 1989, at A16 (editorial)); ROBERT FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT
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eradicate, the "conditions [that were] detrimental to the maintenance of the
minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general
well-being of workers. ' 35  The FLSA set a minimum wage, regulated
maximum work hours, required employers to begin accurate record
keeping and reporting, and restricted child labor.36 As yet another example
of agricultural exceptionism, the FLSA - like the NLRA - did not apply
to farmworkers.
The farmworkers, who were nearly powerless as a result of
agricultural exceptionism, were no match for the growers. The growers
consistently sought new ways to depress wages and to increase their
profits. One such way was to ensure the availability of an abundant supply
of agricultural workers. 37 For years, growers lobbied Congress for a
worker exchange program that would import workers from Mexico. In the
1940's, World War H's impact on the labor force - drawing many men to
the armed forces through enlistment or the draft and thousands of others to
work in wartime industries - gave growers the final argument they needed
to convince Congress to adopt such a program.
B. The Second Stage: The Birth of Labor Contracting through the
Adoption of the Bracero Program (1942-1964)
From 1942 until 1964, many growers obtained labor through the
POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS 144 (1985); SIMON ROTIENBERG,
Introduction to THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL MINIMUM WAGES 1 (Simon Rottenberg ed.
1981)).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a).
36. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219.
37. Reduction of labor costs has long been a chief objective of growers because all
agricultural harvesting is labor-intensive. See Miriam 3. Wells, Politics, Locality, and
Economic Restructuring: California's Central Coast Strawberry Industry in the Post-World
War 1I Period, 76 CLARK U. J. OF ECON. GEOGRAPHY 28, 36 (2000) (noting that for
strawberries, one of California's major crops:
Labor is the largest single cost, constituting about half of total production costs
on the central coast. Its timing and steady availability are crucial, because
deviation from a carefully specified timetable depresses production, and
because the high value, yields, and perishability of the crop make harvest
interruptions costly.... The importance of harvest labor is due to the facts that
growers cannot eliminate it and it is virtually the only cost they can control.).
See also Farmworkers Justice Fund Report on Re: El Paso and Juarez (explaining how many
growers attempt to increase the labor supply and reduce labor costs by busing workers into
their United States fields from Mexican border towns); DANIEL ROTHENBERG, WITH THESE
HANDS: THE HIDDEN WORLD OF MIGRANT FARmWORKERS TODAY 17 (1998) (describing a
common day for Gilberto Perez, a resident of Mexicali, Mexico who awakes daily around
1:00 a.m. to cross the border to work in the fields of Imperial Valley or occasionally as far
away as San Clemente - three hours away, only to return home around 11:00 p.m. that
night).
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Mexican Labor Program, commonly known as the Bracero Program.38 This
bilateral agreement between the United States and Mexico permitted the
United States government to import agricultural workers from Mexico to
toil in the fields of private growers. 39 The two governments arranged a
contract wage and agreed on minimally acceptable working conditions.
The imported workers, or braceros, were limited exclusively to agricultural
work, however, and any bracero who found a job in another industry was
subject to immediate deportation.4 °
Despite the bilateral agreement on pay and working conditions, the
Bracero Program nevertheless resulted in widespread abuse.41 In fact, in
1943, only a year after the program's inception, "Mexico banned the
braceros from working in Texas... because of abusive and discriminatory
treatment" of its nationals.42
The bad situation-worsened on July 1, 1943, when supervision of the
Bracero Program was shifted from the Farm Security Administration to the
38. The term "Bracero" was derived from the Spanish word "brazo," which means
"arm" and refers to a system that was created to provide United States growers with strong
"armed workers" for labor, who would come to toil in the fields without bringing their
wives, children, or families.
39. ERNESTO GALARZA, FARM WORKERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS IN CALIFORNIA, 1947-
1960 xi-xii (1977):
Public Law 78, enacted by Congress in July 1951, gave the bracero system the
sanction of federal law, creating a farm labor contracting scheme that in time
could mobilize the unemployed masses of Mexico to displace domestic farm
workers. As the system was perfected and refined in response to the demands
of corporate agriculture, it had a bright and extended future. There was a
seemingly. inexhaustible reserve of manpower south of the border. Growers had
a long experience in labor manipulation, which could be more efficiently
coordinated at the higher levels of bureaucracy and diplomacy. State and
federal agencies were at hand to provide logistic facilities. The farms to which
the braceros were assigned.., were sufficiently removed from public view to
avoid disturbing the national conscience. And the whole of the process was
represented, insofar as explanations were necessary, as the response of agri-
business [sic] to the national food shortage, world hunger, and the crisis of
democracy.
See also MAJKA & MAJKA, supra note 32, at 139 (noting that the United States government
was actually designated the "employer" in the labor contracts and the United States "took
responsibility for supplying braceros to individual growers [which] ... in effect.., placed
the government in the position of a huge labor contractor").
40. VERNON M. BRIGGS, JR., THE MEXICO-UNITED STATES BORDER: PUBLIC POLICY AND
CHICANO ECONOMIC WELFARE 7 (Center for the Study of Hum. Resources and the Bureau of
Bus. Res. of the U. of Tex. at Austin 1974).
41. See MAJKA & MAJKA, supra note 32, at 136 (quoting Lee G. Williams, a United
States Department of Labor official who helped supervise the Bracero Program as he
referred to the program as "legalized slavery" because federal law entirely controlled the
braceros' status, work contracts, and their mobility). See generally KUSHNER, supra note
33; MCWILLIAMS, supra note 32.
42. See BRIGGS, supra note 40, at 7.
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grower-dominated War Food Administration.43 Soon after the change in
control, enforcement of many of the worker protections came to a halt and
the braceros "were exploited beyond description by growers, labor
contractors, and merchants.
' 4
It was the change in control combined with the new abundance of
workers that severely worsened the working conditions for all
farmworkers:
Agricultural work became increasingly arduous: the short-handle
hoe 5 was introduced, hourly rates were substituted for piece
rates, production quotas were instituted, and more time was lost
moving from field to field .... Gradually a substantial
proportion of domestic farm workers lost their jobs to braceros
and could not find enough employment in the fields to survive.
Especially vulnerable were members or supporters of fledgling
farm labor unions, who were apparently singled out for
replacement by braceros.46
While the Bracero Program legalized exploitation for farmworkers, it
was extremely advantageous to growers throughout its twenty-two years of
existence.47 The growers, who had convinced Congress that there was anagricultural labor supply shortage,41 utilized the Bracero Program not only
43. See CAREY MCWILLIAMS, NORTH FROM MEXIco: THE SPANISH-SPEAKING PEOPLE OF
THE UNITED STATES 238 (Greenwood Press 1990) (1948) (noting that the shift of control
was "tantamount to turning the whole program over to the farm associations").
44. DAY, supra note 25, at 35.
45. The short-handle hoe was one of the most arduous devices used to control
farmworkers. Because of this tool's short length, workers had to stoop down very low to
reach the ground. The foreman could then tell who was taking a break by looking for
workers who were standing upright. Even though this tool was medically proven to cause
serious back injuries, it was not outlawed in California until 1975. See Carmona v. Div. of
Indus. Safety, 13 Cal. 3d 303 (1975) (setting aside the Division's decision that the "short-
handled hoe" was not an "unsafe hand tool" within the meaning of Cal. Admin. Code tit. 8,
§ 3316, an administrative regulation prohibiting the use of unsafe tools).
46. MAKA & MAiKA, supra note 32, at 153.
47. Id. at 136 ("The influx of braceros represented another transition in the agricultural
labor supply, one which brought tremendous economic benefits for agribusiness.").
48. See VERNON M. BRIGGS, JR., CHICANOS AND RuRAL POVERTY 29-30 (The Johns
Hopkins University Press 1973) (noting that the statistics show that the supposed domestic
labor shortage can only be dismissed as an artificial creation of manmade policies);
ADVISORY COMIUTrE ON FARMi LABOR RESEARCH, ASSEMBLY COMMITrE ON AGRICULTURE,
THE CALIFORNIA FARM LABOR FORCE: A PROFILE 45 (1969) (finding that in 1965: (1) only
thirty-three percent of migrant farmworkers experienced less than sixteen weeks of full
employment; (2) only about fifty-seven percent of farmworkers were fully employed half of
the year; and (3) only about twelve percent of migrants and twenty percent of regular
farmworkers were fully employed for forty-one weeks or more); see also MAJKA & MAiKA,
supra note 32, at 136 (noting that "[t]he single most important reason for the long survival
of the bracero program was [that] ... [g]overnment agents in charge of the programs
repeatedly accepted without question grower claims of impending labor shortages and the
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to ensure that they had the "cheapest" supply of labor by creating fierce
competition, 49 but also to undercut any attempts at union mobilization. 0
The Bracero Program was extremely effective in both of these areas.
The Bracero Program's effect on unionization in particular was
severe. Workers who joined unions were easily and swiftly replaced. The
ability to order a new supply of workers at any time enabled growers
throughout the country to crush strikes effectively. 1
In the early 1960's, Congress finally realized that its failure to provide
farmworkers with some protections had enabled the "plight of the migrant
laborer in this country... [to become] an inexcusable and cancerous sore
in the body politic. 512 Farmworkers' "transportation and living conditions
[were] far below the general standard of living [and] ... indeed inhuman,
[they were] the very worst conditions of human life in this country, totally
unacceptable for human beings."5 3 Ironically, the Secretary of Labor in
1963, Willard Wirtz, found it "an anomaly that the workers who stand in
the greatest need of social and economic protections are the ones who have
been denied such protection.,
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Bilateral political tensions began to escalate as the Bracero Program's
rampant abuses received more public attention in the United States and as
the Mexican government became increasingly aware of American growers'
disdain and rejection of any working conditions standards. As a result, the
program came to an abrupt end in 1964.ss
The horrific exploitation of farmworkers witnessed throughout the
Bracero Program caused the demise of the program and influenced
Congress to pass legislation to protect farmworkers. In 1963, in an attempt
consequent necessity of importing braceros").
49. See BRIGGS, supra note 40, at 7 (explaining that competition in the agricultural
labor market was fierce and the availability of braceros served to depress wage rates).
50. See MAJIKA & MAiKA, supra note 32, at 137 ("The option of employing braceros
was used by growers to undercut the negotiating position of domestic workers. Wages
remained exceedingly low, and living and working conditions showed little tendency to
improve. Unionization was effectively blocked.").
51. KUSHNER, supra note 33, at 100 (noting the use of braceros to break strikes in the
Imperial and San Joaquin Valleys).
52. 110 CONG. REc. 19,896 (1964) (statement of Rep. Bennett).
53. Id. at 19,894 (statement of Rep. Powell).
54. Migratory Labor Board: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Migratory Labor of the
Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare on S. 521, S. 522, S. 523, S. 524, S. 525, and S. 526, Bs.
Relating to Various Migratory Labor Programs, 88th Cong. 29 (1963) (statement of Willard
Wirtz, Sec. of Labor).
55. Many attribute the demise of the Bracero Program to a shift in American politics
stimulated by the civil rights movement and the rise of national support for farmworkers led
by key leaders, such as John F. Kennedy. See MAJKA & MAJKA, supra note 32, at 158
(acknowledging that Congress's failure to extend Public Law 78 beyond 1964 appeared "to
contradict the prevailing tendency of government policies and actions to favor
agribusiness").
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to stabilize the labor force by controlling the growers' use of unscrupulous
labor contractors, Congress enacted the Farm Labor Contractor
Registration Act of 1963 ("FLCRA").56 Growers began using crew leaders
and labor contractors during the Bracero Program to serve as intermediaries
to handle hiring, firing, transporting, and/or scheduling of the farmworkers.
The FLCRA required labor contractors, or crew leaders, who managed
and transported farmworkers for growers to register with the Department of
Labor. Under the FLCRA, the Department of Labor could revoke a
contractor's certificate of registration if the contractor gave farmworkers
false or misleading information regarding the terms of their employment.
Each contractor could also be fined for any willful violation of the Act.
Unfortunately, enactment of the FLCRA was a short-lived victory.
Enforcement was problematic for several reasons. First, the FLCRA did
not impose large enough penalties on violators. Second, the FLCRA only
penalized the labor contractors so there were no incentives for growers to
ensure that they did not hire unscrupulous contractors. Third, there was not
enough funding and no central agency that could handle broad-based
policing and enforcement. Thus, the FLCRA was ineffective in
accomplishing the goals Congress had set for it.
In light of FLCRA's failure, several years later, Congress amended
57FLSA to extend its minimum wage requirements to include some
agricultural workers.58 This amendment signifies the end of agricultural
exceptionism.
This amendment, like the FLCRA, was also a very brief victory for
farmworkers since growers quickly learned to devise creative employment
relationships to circumvent the FLSA's protections. Many growers
transformed their workforce into either labor contractors or sharecroppers
to avoid liability while paying the lowest wages. Most growers chose the
sharecropping method following the demise of the Bracero Program.
C. The Third Stage: The Fall of the Bracero Program and the Rise of
Sharecropping
Numerous growers seeking to cut labor costs adopted the
sharecropping method. Under the sharecropping system, the grower would
divide his property into small parcels, generally two and a half to five
acres. The grower then assigned these parcels to individuals carefully
56. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2041-2055 (1994).
57. Still not all farmworkers were included because the FLSA explicitly provided that it
did not apply to family farms.
58. S. REP. No. 89-1487, at 9 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3002, 3010
(noting how the amendment would extend the minimum wage requirements of the FLSA to
390,000 farmworkers).
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selected based on their experience as farmworkers and their access to either
a large nuclear family or a network of extended acquaintances. 9
The sharecropper system enabled growers to reclassify their
farmworker employees as self-employed entrepreneurs. Growers,
however, rarely gave up any significant amount of control, and the ability
of the sharecropper to make a substantial living was illusory. 60 In fact,
growers still provided all capital, machinery, and tools; prescribed all
production practices; and hired individuals to manage all complex or costly
operations. Growers also contributed all seeds or seedling plants,
pesticides, fertilizers, irrigation equipment, tractors, trucks, harvesting
equipment, and storage containers. Their agents fumigated the soil,
prepared the ground for planting, and hauled, refrigerated, and marketed
the crop once it was harvested. Thus:
In practice, sharecroppers' only substantial discretion was over
who they hired and how much they paid them. Sharecropping
families generally did the winter work themselves, but almost all
had to hire workers during the harvest. Sharecroppers generally
received half of the market returns from the sale of the fruit,
minus the cost of crates and baskets, from which they paid hired
labor. About 90 percent of sharecroppers had written contracts
which detailed the rights and responsibilities of each party and
emphasized that the sharecropper was legally an independent
contractor.61
While these contracts customarily only lasted for one year, the grower
could terminate a contract at any time if he believed the sharecropper's
performance was unsatisfactory.
For the growers, this system was extremely advantageous. First, even
though this system treated farmworkers as independent entrepreneurs,
growers rarely made less money by using sharecroppers than when they
hired workers themselves to do the harvest. By giving the task of labor
recruitment and management to the sharecroppers, growers gained access
to the individual's family and friends, who would often work for lower or
59. See LINDER, supra note 26, at 248-49 (noting that family heads who become
sharecroppers often co-exploit not only members of their nuclear families but also relatives
and friends); MIRIAM J. WELLS, STRAWBERRY FIELDS: POLITICS, CLASS, AND WORK IN
CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE 237-38 (1996) (explaining how many growers "approached long-
time harvest workers and offered to make them sharecroppers" as long as they had large
nuclear families or wide interpersonal networks).
60. See 112 CONG. REC. 11, 623 (1966) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1366, at 32 (1966))
(statement of Rep. Powell) ("testimony indicates that there are large numbers of so-called
sharecroppers who are not allowed to make a single economic decision regarding the land
upon which they live and work.... For these people, the term 'sharecropping' only denotes
a means of compensation.").
61. WELLS, supra note 59 (emphasis added).
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no wages to help their father, brother, uncle, or friend. For the
sharecroppers, many of whom were brought to the United States as
braceros, sharecropping became an entrepreneurial venture and they
initially saw it as an opportunity to overcome poverty and low-paid work.
Second, using the sharecropper system enabled growers to avoid
paying minimum wages, overtime, workers' compensation, payroll taxes,
and unemployment insurance. In addition, neither growers nor
sharecroppers were subject to any liability under the FLSA because the Act
62does not apply to family farms. Thus, sharecroppers were free to use
underage workers and to pay less than minimum wage. Moreover, all
liability was shifted to the dreamy-eyed sharecropper.
Third, the use of sharecroppers severely undercut the threat of
unionization. Because the workers were friends or family members of the
sharecropper, they were very unlikely to be recruiting targets of the UFW.
The wages and benefits of farmworkers engaged in this system were less
responsive to union standards because they technically worked for
themselves, for family members, or for friends.
Because of its abuses, however, the sharecropper system was well
under attack in California by the late 1970's.63 The growers lost a major
battle in Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Associates, Inc.64 In that case, fifteen
sharecroppers from Salinas Valley in California sued their employers for
minimum wage violations of the FLSA. They challenged their
sharecropper agreement, titled "Patent Sublicense and Subcontract for
Growing Strawberry Crop with Sublicensee" ("Agreement"), 6 claiming
that it was a "sham" and that they were actually regular employees entitled
to back wages.
The district court granted summary judgment for the growers and held
that as a matter of law the individuals were independent contractors and not
employees under the FLSA. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
summary judgment, stating, "the test, as always, must focus on the
economic realities of the total circumstances. 66 An attorney who was very
involved in this type of litigation compared the Agreement in Driscoll to
many used at the time, and joked that the agreements were "so one-sided
it's difficult to keep them on your desktop."67
62. See supra note 59 (citing the exception to the Fair Labor Standards Act that
excludes family farms).
63. See In the Matter of Patane, No. SJ-T-748 (Sept. 13, 1979) (ruling that "[t]o find
that the petitioner had relinquished its right to control would require this Board to close its
eyes to the reality of the working conditions of the pickers").
64. 603 F.2d 748, 756 (9th Cir. 1979).
65. Id. Driscoll had various patents for growing different types of strawberries. The
contracts permitted the sharecroppers to use these patents as sublicensees. Id.
66. Id.
67. LwnDER, supra note 26, at 257 (citing a letter from Steven Belasco, attorney,
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Under the Agreement, Driscoll would plant the crops and the workers
would tend, harvest, sort, grade, and pack the ripe strawberries. Despite the
Agreement's indication otherwise, Driscoll actually paid the sharecroppers
a piece rate to plant the strawberries. Apart from hand hoes, shovels,
clippers, and handcarts, Driscoll also furnished the sharecroppers with all
tools and materials.
Using the economic-reality test, the Ninth Circuit found that Driscoll
exercised too much control over the sublicensees' fields to be
"independently viable enterprise[s]" and that the workers had little or no
opportunity for profit or loss. 6 8 The court remanded the case to the trial
court, but before the trial could resume, the case was settled in 1981.
The California Supreme Court in S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. State
Department of Industrial Relations69 struck another blow to the
sharecropper system in 1989. In Borello, the Court held as a matter of law
that the defendants "failed to demonstrate that the cucumber sharefarmers
[we]re independent contractors excluded from coverage of the [Fair Labor
Standards] Act., 70  Largely due to the Borello and Driscoll decisions,
growers have abandoned the use of the sharecropper system in favor of
employing labor contractors.
D. The Fourth Stage: Growers' Transition from Using Sharecroppers to
Establishing a Network of Labor Contractors
After the Bracero Program, the second major method chosen by
growers in order to cut labor costs was the use of "independent" labor
contractors. As the sharecropper relationship began losing its appeal,
numerous growers adopted the independent contractor method instead.
Using labor contractors allows growers to continue maximizing profits
by shielding themselves from liability under FLSA, which only applies to
employers.71 Under the independent labor contractor relationship, growers
claim that they are no longer the employer of farmworkers since now the
labor contractor handles all employment responsibilities, including
recruiting, hiring, firing, transporting, paying, and supervising.
When growers hire a labor contractor to employ farmworkers to
harvest their crops, it is largely a process of shifting the work that was
previously done by the growers or employees of the growers on the
California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA) to Richard Pearl, attorney, CRLA (July 27,
1977)).
68. Driscoll, 603 F.2d at 755.
69. 48 Cal. 3d 341 (1989).
70. Id. at 360. Note that although sharecropping is a form of independent contracting,
the Court here used the term "independent contractors" interchangeably with
"sharecropper."
71. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872 (1994).
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growers' premises to an artificial entity.72 For example, growers will hire a
labor contractor to carry out a particular farming project, such as preparing
the fields for planting, planting seeds or seedlings, and harvesting the
ripened crops for a specific fee.73 After negotiating with the grower for the
fee, the labor contractor is responsible for all administrative tasks involving
the farmworkers: hiring, scheduling, paying, and firing. In addition, the
labor contractors must contribute any required benefits and withhold all
income taxes due.
The growers still control all major entrepreneurial aspects of the
business. The growers decide which crops to plant and when to harvest.
After the harvest, the growers are also free to market and sell the produce
as they wish. Hence, there are no major distinctions between this type of
relationship and the typical employer-employee relationship that could
justify the numerous benefits to those growers that operate under the
independent contractor framework, which enables them to avoid paying
benefits and relieves them of any liability.74
The independent labor contractor system, however, has serious
disadvantages for farmworkers. First, permitting growers to dodge liability
leaves farmworkers - those who most need minimum-wage protection -
without any effective legal recourse. After signing a contract to harvest the
grower's fields, the labor contractor steps into the grower's shoes and
becomes the farmworkers' statutory "employer." Bringing a suit against
the independent contractor provides little relief as the labor contractors,
who usually are ex-farmworkers themselves, can rarely afford to pay
damages or back wages should their workers succeed on a wage and hour
claim, for instance.
Second, the use of independent labor contractors causes another tier of
competition, which further depresses the wages for farmworkers. Bidding
competition between labor contractors for harvesting contracts creates a
cycle that encourages a race to the lowest common substandard wages and
working conditions. The bid takes into account fixed and variable costs.
Fixed costs include machinery maintenance, fuel, tools, and supplies,
which generally cannot be reduced. The only two variable costs are wages
and profits for the labor contractor. In order to bid competitively the labor
72. Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern American
Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REv. 983,
992-95 (1999).
73. Often, growers request multiple bids from different labor contractors, who will
compete for either a temporary or a seasonal contract.
74. The benefits to growers who use labor contractors are similar to those explained in
the section on sharecropping, supra section C, except that liability is shifted to the labor
contractors instead of the sharecroppers. In addition, the labor contractors are subject to the
FLSA's minimum wage requirements and restrictions on underage workers since, unlike the
sharecropper arrangement, the labor contractor relationship does not create a "family farm."
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contractor must reduce either the wages and benefits provided to his
workers or his own profits. As a result, labor contractors who are willing
to provide their workers with respectable wages are driven out of the
market, and the only jobs available for the farmworkers are the lowest
paying.75
Third, farmworkers are subject to exploitation because growers and
labor contractors know that they rarely seek to enforce their legal rights.
Faced with the risk of being blacklisted and unemployed, coupled with the
lack of access to legal services, farmworkers are reluctant to become
involved in lawsuits that can drag on for up to ten years and cost a
considerable amount of money.
Fourth, there are no serious penalties for those labor contractors who
violate the law. Even if the farmworkers sue and eventually prevail, the
labor contractors nonetheless "will have gained years of cheap labor."
76
Thus, many labor contractors continue unlawful employment practices
even after courts have ruled against them."
Despite these problems and numerous others, the courts have refused
to strike down the use of independent contractors as an illegal practice.
Instead, the courts have developed complex balancing tests to determine
whether or not a grower is actually an employer.78 If held to be the
75. See Goldstein et. al., supra note 72, at 995 (discussing the existence of even a third
tier of competition at the level of growers.)
Growers using labor contractors who do not pay the minimum wage and deduct
but do not pay Social Security taxes have... lower costs and higher profits than
growers whose workers receive lawful minimum wages and benefits.
Consequently, bad growers drive good growers out of business or force them to
avail themselves of crew leaders' illegalities to survive.
76. Id., LINDER, supra note 26, at 178.
77. Id. at 179 (noting also that the workers who do sue "must bear the burden and
expense of discovering in every case the specific facts that will sustain the allegation of an
employment relationship").
78. The most common test uses the following five factors: (1) the nature and degree of
control of the workers; (2) the degree of supervision, direct or indirect, of the work; (3) the
power to determine the pay rates or the methods of payment of the workers; (4) the right,
directly or indirectly, to hire, fire, or modify the employment conditions of the workers; and
(5) the preparation of payroll and the payment of wages. 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(4) (noting
also that this is not an exhaustive list of factors to consider).
Courts have also used other non-regulatory factors, including the following: (1) whether
the work was a "specialty job on the production line"; (2) whether responsibility under the
contracts between a labor contractor and an employer pass from one labor contractor to
another without "material changes"; (3) whether the "premises and equipment" of the
employer are used for the work; (4) whether the employees had a "business organization
that could or did shift as a unit from one [worksite] to another"; (5) whether the work was
"piecework" and not work that required "initiative, judgment or foresight"; (6) whether the
employees had an "opportunity for profit or loss depending upon [their] managerial skills";
(7) whether there was "permanence [in] the working relationship"; and (8) whether "the
service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer's business." See Rutherford
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employer, growers would be required to ensure that labor contractors
respect the rights of farmworkers. Scholars have argued that the court's
development and use of these tests have resulted in a failure to apply the
law correctly.79
Congress has also been ineffective in protecting farmworkers from
abuses that permeate the independent labor contractor system. The
FLCRA, enacted in 1963, was not well designed to penalize those labor
contractors who violate the law. The mandatory registration for all farm
labor contractors led to the rise of numerous underground independent
labor contractors, who are even more unscrupulous because they ignore
other laws as well.
Due to the ineffectiveness of the FLCRA, Congress again tried to
combat the woes of the labor contractor system by enacting the Migrant
and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act ("AWPA") in 1983.'o
Congress hoped the AWPA would "[correct] the key weakness of the
FLCRA, which held only the farm labor contractor responsible for such
abuses and shielded the employer unless he fell within the narrow
definition of 'farm labor contractor' under [the FLCRA]."' To increase
the Act's effectiveness, Congress broadened the definition of employer in
82the new Act. From the legislative history, it is clear that Congress
expected growers to ensure that labor contractors complied with the
AWPA. According to one member of Congress, "[a]gricultural
employers.., will for the first time be sure of their duties to migrant
workers. Agricultural employees will in turn, know who is responsible for
their protections, by fixing responsibility on those who ultimately benefit
from their labors - the agricultural employer.
8 3
The AWPA created some helpful provisions, but it was just as
unsuccessful as the FLCRA. Again, the Act was poorly designed to
impose any significant monetary penalties on violators. In addition, the
enforcement of AWPA has always lacked sufficient funding to police the
entire agricultural industry. Finally, the courts' regular refusal to hold
employers liable has made the AWPA increasingly ineffective.
Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947) (using factors 1, 2, 4, and 5); Real v.
Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979) (using factors 3, 6, 7, and 8).
79. See generally Goldstein et.al., supra note 72 (advocating persuasively that the
courts should read the FLSA's definition of "employ" to include growers who use
independent labor contractors).
80. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1872 (1994).
81. 128 CONG. REc. 32,883 (1982) (statement of Rep. Ford).
82. 29 U.S.C. § 1802(2) (defining "agricultural employer" for purposes of the AWPA
as "any person who owns or operates a farm, ranch, processing establishment, cannery, gin,
packing shed or nursery, or who produces or conditions seed, and who either recruits,
solicits, hires, employs, furnishes, or transports any migrant or seasonal agricultural
worker").
83. 128 CONG. REc. 26,008 (1982) (Statement of Rep. Miller).
2002]
620 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 4:3
IV. CONCLUSION
The issues that arose in Vizcaino v. Microsoft are a result of the four-
stage evolution of the law as applied to farmworkers. In particular,
Microsoft's ability to deny benefits to a portion of its workforce stems from
the development of the fourth stage. Unlike the first three stages in the
evolution, the independent contractor system, which rose to prominence in
the fourth stage, is not unique to agricultural workers. 84 In fact, employers
in other industries, including Microsoft, have already begun to use this
method to deny benefits to certain portions of their workforce.
Vizcaino is important for at least two reasons. First, Vizcaino exposes
the state of the law today. In Vizcaino, a class of plaintiffs challenged
Microsoft's ability to utilize the independent contractor system to avoid
paying benefits that it provided to other employees.85 Unfortunately, the
Ninth Circuit's decision focused on Microsoft's careless drafting of the
benefits contracts rather than Microsoft's ability to use the independent
contractor system to contract around the employer-employee relationship.86
This refusal to address the real issue shows that a method once reserved for
farmworkers has percolated into other industries.
Second, Vizcaino foreshadows the future development of the law.
Microsoft's division of its workforce represents an attempt to create a
reverse evolution, which would leave many other workers in a position
similar to farmworkers. If this evolution is not redirected, we will see the
"farmworkerization" of other industries. Specifically, unless employers are
prevented from utilizing the independent contractor system to deny benefits
to certain workers, they will proceed further and deny benefits to their
entire workforce. Thus, employees in other industries will find themselves
in a position similar to farmworkers today, where all are denied the benefits
attached to the employer-employee relationship.
Recognizing that there are no moral distinctions between farmworkers
and more professional workers, differential treatment by the law is not
warranted. The Ninth Circuit in Vizcaino believed that the Microsoft
workers had the right to work with the dignity afforded to all regular
employees. Farmworkers deserve this same dignity. Had the Ninth Circuit
understood the significance of Microsoft's actions and recognized the
broader historical context, the court may have approached the issue
84. Recall that the first three stages were agricultural exceptionism, the Bracero
Program, and sharecropping.
85. See supra section II.A.
86. Id.
87. Another recent emergence of this system has been in the supermarket janitorial
industry. See Nancy Cleeland, Heartache on Aisle 3: Sweatshop for Janitors, L.A. TIMES,
July 2, 2000, at Al (reporting that large supermarket chains are outsourcing to a subpar
system of subcontractors who recruit recent immigrants for janitorial positions).
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differently and provided more appropriate remedies.
We are now at an important juncture. Farmworkers are worse off than
they have ever been.8 In order to help the farmworkers and to prevent the
"farmworkerization" of other industries, the courts or Congress must take
action to eliminate the employer's ability to contract around its duties. In
order to avoid the mistakes of the past, these actions should ensure that all
workers are treated equally, regardless of whether they are in the fields or
in a high-tech industry.
88. See California Rural Legal Assistance Foundation, Farm Labor Contractor Abuses
In California: A Survey of Rural Law Offices' Recent Cases Reveals Widespread Lawless
Conduct - Greater Accountability Of Farm Operators That Utilize FLCs Appears Justified
(2000) (citing numerous abuses). Additionally, growers still "cry wolf' about agricultural
labor shortages. During the past legislative session, United States Senators Bob Graham
and Gordon Smith, in cooperation with members of the House of Representatives,
introduced legislation that would create a new Bracero Program. See Agricultural Job
Opportunity Benefits and Security Act of 1999, S. 1814, 106th Cong. (1999); Farmworker
Adjustment Act of 1999, S. 1815, 106th Cong. (1999); Agricultural Opportunities Act, H.R.
4548, 106th Cong. (1999); Agricultural Job Opportunity Benefits and Security Act of 2000,
H.R. 4056, 106th Cong. (2000); see also Joel Millman, The Great California Farmhand
Debate, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2001, at A17. In lobbying for this type of legislation, growers
continue to misrepresent the availability of labor. According to one report, however, there
are enough agricultural workers to harvest simultaneously every grower's crops if they
could be ripe for the harvesting at the same time. See Farmworkers Justice Fund Report,
supra note 37.
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